I. INTRODUCTION Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. United States District Court for the Western District of Texas
1 is, at first glance, a simple case. Two parties enter into a contract. Party A promises to pay Party B to complete a task. The contract requires litigation in State Court X or Federal Court X. Party B completes the task, but Party A refuses to pay. Party B sues for breach of contract in Federal Court Y. What must Federal Court Y do? The contract requires Federal Court Y to transfer the case to Federal Court X-correct? This resolution feels intuitively fair. The parties agreed, * For an excellent article concerning the topics discussed in this Note, see Matthew J. Sorensen, Note, Enforcement of Forum-Selection Clauses in Federal Court After Atlantic Marine, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2521 (2014 . I completed the final draft of this Note before reading Mr. Sorensen's article, from which I drew no support or analysis.
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) • DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2014.325 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu broader right to contract, and the "ouster" theory declined in application in the state and federal courts.
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A. M/S Bremen
The inflection point for forum-selection agreements came in 1972, when the Court in M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. found forum-selection clauses "prima facie valid," unless the resisting party proved the clause "unreasonable." 6 There, after an accident at sea, an American oil-rig owner (Zapata) sued a German tugboat company in a Florida federal court in violation of the parties' maritime contract, which required litigation in London, England. 7 In upholding the agreement, the Court dismissed the "ouster" doctrine as a "vestigial legal fiction" that reflected "a provincial attitude" toward the "fairness of other tribunals."
8 The Court emphasized the growth of international trade and the predictability provided by forum-selection agreements:
[M]uch uncertainty and possibly great inconvenience to both parties could arise if a suit could be maintained in any jurisdiction in which an accident might occur or if jurisdiction were left to any place (where personal or in rem jurisdiction might be established). The elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element in international trade, commerce, and contracting. 5 See Cent. Contracting Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 367 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1966 ) (finding a forum-selection enforceable); Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Centra Cast Co., 270 F. Supp. 999, 1000 (E.D.N.Y. 1966 ) (finding a forum-selection clause "valid and enforceable" on grounds that "the public policy of the State of New York [was] not offended by the stipulation for local venue, nor [was] defendant's acquiescence, obtained presumably as a condition for plaintiff's not inconsiderable commitment of funds to the enterprise whose obligations were guaranteed, shocking to a judicial conscience" and noting that " [a] court should, absent strong countervailing considerations, give the parties' agreement for venue its intended effect"); Cent. Contracting Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl & Co., 209 A.2d 810, 816 (Pa. 1965) ("[A] court in which venue is proper and which has jurisdiction should decline to proceed with the cause when the parties have freely agreed that litigation shall be conducted in another forum and where such agreement is not unreasonable at the time of litigation."). 6 M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 1 (internal quotations omitted). 7 Id. at 2-4. 8 Id. at 12. 9 Id. at 13-14 (emphasis added). Based upon this reasoning, the Court remanded the case to afford Zapata the opportunity to carry its "heavy burden" of proving not only that the "balance of convenience [was] strongly in favor of trial" in the Florida federal court, but that litigation in London would be "so manifestly and gravely inconvenient" that it would "effectively deprive[]" Zapata of "a meaningful day in court." 10 The Court observed that Zapata could resist the forum-selection agreement only by proving "fraud, undue influence," "overweening bargaining power," or contravention of the selected forum's "strong public policy," whether declared by "statute or by judicial decision." 11 The Court implicitly encouraged the American legal community to "face the realities of the need for certainty in international transactions," such that the nation "might continue to benefit from world trade."
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Issues soon arose, however. Courts applied M/S Bremen only in admiralty cases based upon the Court's note that the "reasonable" contract in M/S Bremen was international and maritime in nature.
13 Judges, moreover, hesitated to enforce forum-selection clauses within contracts of adhesion because the agreement in M/S Bremen was not a "form contract with boilerplate language" that Zapata had "no power to alter" 14 but a product of "arm's length negotiation" between "experienced 14 See, e.g., Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 1990 ) (asking whether the plaintiff should have been "prevented from enforcing the [forum-selection] clause because it [was] "buried in the fine print and was not 'freely negotiated'" and noting the "widespread judicial suspicion of the form contract-the dreaded 'contract of adhesion,' the contract that is offered by the authoring party on a take it or leave it basis rather than being negotiated between the parties"); 
B. Shute
In 1991, the Court in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute 16 held that M/S Bremen's "reasonableness" test applies to domestic and adhesion contracts. There, the Shutes purchased Carnival cruise tickets through a Washington travel agency.
17
The tickets required litigation in a Florida federal court.
18 While at sea, Eulala Shute slipped and sustained injuries. 19 The Shutes sued in a Washington federal court, which granted Carnival's motion to dismiss. 20 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and allowed the suit to proceed in Washington, invalidating the Florida forum-selection clause because it "was not freely bargained for."
21
The Supreme Court reversed and found the forum-selection clause "reasonable" under M/S Bremen, though it did not stem from arm's length negotiation. 22 The Court reasoned that the tickets represented a "purely routine," reasonable passage contract "nearly identical" to those "issued by [Carnival] and most other cruise lines." 23 The Court found it "entirely unreasonable" to assume that the Shutes or "any other cruise passenger" would "negotiate" a forum-selection agreement in purchasing an "ordinary commercial cruise ticket."
24 "[C]ommon sense" dictated that such tickets are invariably "form contract [s] ," the terms of Legal scholars impugned Shute, contending that adhesive consumer forumselection agreements should be per se unenforceable "as a matter of pure contract law" because they compel "unwitting plaintiffs" to forfeit legitimate claims based merely upon their "frequent inability" to sue in a "distant, inconvenient courtroom."
26 Despite this criticism, however, the Shute Court affirmed that the enforceability of forum-selection agreements does not depend upon arm's length negotiation.
III. FEDERAL VENUE AND PRIVATE FORUM SELECTION: STEWART
In 1988, the Court in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. 27 addressed whether a private forum-selection agreement can supersede federal law with respect to the propriety of "venue" in a preselected forum.
There, an Alabama business contracted with a New York business to market copier products. 28 The contract required litigation in a New York federal or state 25 Id. In upholding the clause, the Court noted:
Including a reasonable forum clause in a form contract of this kind well may be permissible for several reasons: First, a cruise line has a special interest in limiting the fora in which it potentially could be subject to suit. Because a cruise ship typically carries passengers from many locales, it is not unlikely that a mishap on a cruise could subject the cruise line to litigation in several different fora. Additionally, a clause establishing ex ante the forum for dispute resolution has the salutary effect of dispelling any confusion about where suits arising from the contract must be brought and defended, sparing litigants the time and expense of pretrial motions to determine the correct forum and conserving judicial resources that otherwise would be devoted to deciding those motions. Finally, it stands to reason that passengers who purchase tickets containing a forum clause like that at issue in this case benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be sued. Why did it matter whether the Alabama district court enforced the forumselection agreement under § § 1406(a) or 1404(a)? Although not emphasized in Stewart, § § 1404(a) and 1406(a) differ both textually and interpretatively. Under § 1404(a), district courts "may" transfer cases "to any other district" in which the case "might have been brought" initially. 36 In other words, § 1404(a) gives district courts discretion to transfer cases in which the transferor court is already a proper "venue." Conversely, § 1406(a) provides that the district court "of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong . . . district shall dismiss, or if it be 29 Id. 30 Id. 31 
Id.
32 See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) ; N. Braman, Jr., The Still Unrepressed Myth of Erie, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 403, 407-14 (1989) (discussing Erie and its progeny).
33 Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 24 (1988) . 34 Id. at 25. 35 Id. at 29. The Court agreed that questions of "venue" in diversity actions are governed by federal law (i.e., § 1404(a)) under Erie. 36 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (emphasis added). Whether the plaintiff's selection of "venue" is proper is determined (in the majority of civil actions) under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which enumerates three circumstances in which "venue" in a federal district is proper: (1) federal districts in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the state in which that district is located; (2) federal districts in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) federal districts in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction, if subsections (1) and (2) cannot be satisfied.
38
In Stewart, the Northern District of Alabama (i.e., the prospective transferor court) was already a proper "venue" under § § 1391(b)(1) and (c)(2): The defendant conducted business and, thus, "resided" in the Northern District of Alabama.
39
Dismissal under § 1406(a) for suing in the "wrong" (i.e., improper) "venue" was, therefore, an inappropriate mechanism by which to enforce the forum-selection agreement. 40 The issue remained, however, that the plaintiff sued in the Northern District of Alabama in violation of the parties' agreement to sue only in the New York federal court.
In resolving this issue, the Stewart Court found (implicitly and without emphasis) that where a plaintiff sues in a proper federal "venue" (as determined by § 1391) in violation of a valid forum-selection agreement, the transferor court must treat the defendant's attempt to enforce the agreement as a motion to transfer under § 1404(a). 41 The Court observed that § 1404(a) mandates an "individualized, case- by-case consideration of convenience and fairness," 42 within which the parties' forum-selection agreement receives "neither dispositive," "nor no" consideration. 43 Rather, the agreement was to receive the consideration "Congress provided in § 1404(a)," which directed the federal district courts to:
[t]ake account of factors other than those that bear solely on the parties' private ordering of their affairs [by contract]. The district court also must weigh in the balance the convenience of the witnesses and those public-interest factors of systemic integrity and fairness that, in addition to private concerns, come under the heading of the interest of justice.
44
In so holding, the Stewart Court reasoned that by allowing a private agreement to render improper what Congress expressly deemed proper (i.e., "venue" under § 1391), the very "constitutional provision" for a federal court system would be undermined. 45 With this reasoning, the Court emphasized federalism and uniformity over contractual freedom. Unfortunately, Stewart's implicit holding disordered the process by which federal courts enforced forumselection provisions for nearly two decades.
IV. STEWART DIVIDES THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS
As noted above, the Court in Stewart held implicitly that federal district courts must apply § 1404(a)'s discretionary balancing test to enforce forumselection agreements that require a federal forum. Issues arose, however, as courts struggled to comprehend Stewart's framework.
The federal circuits divided with respect to the very issues resolved implicitly in Stewart, including whether: (A) private forum-selection agreements can render venue improper for purposes of § 1406(a), despite that § 1391(a) governs "venue" in "all" federal civil actions; or whether (B) private forum agreements are merely one factor among many the court must weigh for transfer under § 1404(a).
46
42 Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29. 43 Id. at 31. 44 Id. at 30 (emphasis added). 45 Id. at 32 (internal quotations omitted). Problems arose after Stewart, however, when courts applied Van Dusen to § 1404(a) transfers that did involve forum-selection provisions. After Stewart, and under Van Dusen, plaintiffs had incentive to violate the forum-selection agreements to which they had agreed. Provided the plaintiff sued in a "proper" federal "venue" under § 1391, she could capture the transferor court's choice-of-law rules if the defendant successfully motioned to transfer under § 1404(a).
selection agreement where one party flouts it and sues in an otherwise "proper" venue not designated in the agreement? With respect to the federal circuit split, see, e.g., Kerobo v. Sw. Clean Fuels, Corp., 285 F.3d 531, 534-35 (6th Cir. 2002) ("We recognize that the circuits are not in agreement about whether a claim that an action is filed in a forum other than that designated in a contract's forum selection clause may be raised in a Rule 12(b)(3) motion. . . . In essence, the difference of opinion centers around whether the parties' contractual designation of forum can render the venue dictated by statute 'improper.'"); Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d 1285 , 1289 (11th Cir. 1998 Other notable issues arose for litigants seeking to enforce forum-selection agreements. Under Stewart's discretionary "convenience and fairness" test, 50 courts construed forum-selection clauses merely as "significant factor[s]" figuring "centrally" within § 1404(a). 51 When defendants sought to enforce agreements under § 1404(a), district judges, therefore, had near plenary discretion to define what constituted the "fair" and "convenient" circumstances in which a forumselection provision merited a § 1404(a) transfer. Within Stewart's discretionary framework, some courts concluded that plaintiffs waived the right to contest the "convenience" of venue in the agreed-upon court (i.e., private interest factors) upon the execution of a forum-selection agreement, even though Stewart requires the court to weigh public interest factors as well. 52 In assessing whether to transfer under § 1404(a), these courts gave near-dispositive weight to forum-selection agreements, in tacit recognition of contractual freedom. Other courts denied § 1404(a) transfers despite forum-selection agreements on grounds that public interest factors outweighed the defendant's private interest in enforcing the agreement.
53 These courts used a federal procedural rule ( § 1404(a)) to render bargained-for contractual provisions unenforceable, tacitly emphasizing federalism, judicial economy, and jurisdictional uniformity over contractual freedom. Modius, Inc. v. Psinaptic, Inc., No. C 06-02074 SI, 2006 WL 1156390, at *14-15 (N.D. Cal. 2006 ) (noting that the defendant's convenience counts less when defendant signed a forum-selection clause); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Rogerson ATS, 952 F. Supp. 377, 384 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (stating that a valid forum selection clause in a contract waives a party's right to contest venue in that forum). The Court in Stewart left other important issues unresolved. The Court did not determine which party bore the burden of proving "fairness and convenience" under § 1404(a). This left open whether district courts were required to place the burden on the defendant-the party seeking to enforce the forum-selection agreement-or the plaintiff-the party seeking to avoid the agreement's enforcement.
In addition, the Court in Stewart did not address the procedure by which district courts were to enforce forum-selection provisions specifying nonfederal forums, including state and foreign tribunals. This left open whether district courts were required to transfer or dismiss the case under forum non conveniens or § 1406(a), or dismiss under Rules 12(b)(3) or 12(b)(6).
These issues divided the federal circuits for nearly two decades, resulting in systemic unpredictability with respect to the enforceability of otherwise valid forum-selection agreements. The relationship fell apart. J-Crew alleged that Atlantic failed to pay for materials and work performed. 57 In violation of the forum agreement, J-Crew sued Atlantic in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, seeking damages for breach of the subcontract.
V. ENTER ATLANTIC MARINE CONSTRUCTION
A. In the District Court
58 Atlantic moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3) on grounds that the forum-selection clause rendered "venue" in the Western District of Texas "wrong" under § 1406(a). 59 Alternatively, Atlantic moved to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Virginia under § 1404(a).
60
The Texas district court found that the forum-selection clause was "a valid part of the parties' contract" and sought to determine "whether and how" the clause should be enforced: via (A) dismissal or transfer pursuant to § 1406(a) and Rule 12(b)(3) "on the basis of improper venue"; or (B) transfer "for convenience" under § 1404(a). 61 Recognizing that Stewart implicitly resolved the issue, the district court applied Fifth Circuit precedent based thereon:
[The] type of forum designated in the forum-selection clause is determinative of whether dismissal or transfer is the proper means of giving effect to the parties' contractual choice of venue. When a forum-selection clause designates a statecourt forum, an arbitral forum, or a forum in a foreign country, the proper remedy is dismissal. In such cases, the Fifth Circuit has applied the Supreme Court's ["reasonableness"] rule as stated in [M/S Bremen] to determine the enforceability of a forum-selection clause. . . . By contrast, where a forumselection clause designates a specific federal forum or allows the parties to select the state or federal courts of a different forum, the majority of district courts in this circuit have held that a motion to transfer under [ §] Because Atlantic and J-Crew entered into and intended to perform the subcontract in the Western District of Texas, the Texas district court found itself a proper "venue" under § 1391(b)(2).
63
The Texas district court, then, assessed the weight to be accorded the parties' forum-selection clause for purposes of Atlantic's § 1404(a) motion to transfer. As noted by the district court, and discussed above, the decision to transfer under § 1404(a) is committed "to the discretion of the district court," which, under Stewart, must weigh private and public interest factors. 64 The Texas district court found that the parties' forum-selection clause was "only one such factor" and that Atlantic, "as movant, [bore] the burden of establishing the propriety of transfer." 65 Take a moment to consider Atlantic's situation at this point in the litigation. Atlantic and J-Crew entered into a valid contract, under which J-Crew agreed to sue in a specific state or federal forum in Virginia. J-Crew blatantly breached the agreement by suing in the Western District of Texas, under circumstances that fortuitously rendered the Texas district court a proper "venue" under § 1391. Instead of being required to enforce the valid agreement via transfer, the Texas district court had near plenary discretion to employ, in effect, any rationale it deemed relevant in assessing the "weight" of the agreement within Stewart's § 1404(a) "balancing-of-interests" and "convenience" analysis. Making matters worse for Atlantic, the district court placed the burden of demonstrating the propriety of transfer on Atlantic-despite that J-Crew plainly violated their forumselection agreement.
66
In accordance with its broad discretion, the Texas district court found that " [a] balancing of the [private and public] interest factors" militated against a § 1404(a) transfer to Virginia 67 because Atlantic had failed to meet its burden. The case, therefore, remained in the Western District of Texas. 68 63 Id. at *5. 64 Id. at *5-6 ("In addition to the factors set forth in the statutory text [of § 1404(a)], courts consider a nonexhaustive and nonexclusive list of public and private interest factors, none of which are of dispositive weight."). 65 Id. at *5. 66 Id. 67 Id. at *5-8. 68 Id. at *8. 
B. In the Court of Appeals
Atlantic petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for a writ of mandamus compelling the Texas district court to dismiss the case or effect transfer to the Virginia district court based upon the forum-selection agreement.
69
The Fifth Circuit denied Atlantic's petition, emphasizing federalism and judicial economy over contractual freedom:
The core of Stewart is the directive of Congress that allocation of matters among the federal district courts is not wholly controllable by private contract. Rather the agreement of parties will signify in the district court's allocating decision, tempering the private agreement's reflection of private interests with the public interest attentive to the usual metrics of this case law, such as time to trial and convenience of witnesses.
70
Circuit Judge Catharina Haynes, in a special concurrence, disagreed and emphasized the principles of contractual freedom:
Plainly stated, the Supreme Court has made clear that forum-selection clauses are enforceable [under M/S Bremen and Shute] . The effect of the [Texas] district court's ruling, however, is to make forum-selection clauses enforceable by specific performance only at the election of the district court, which is free to render a decision that evades practical review, given our substantial limits on mandamus review, and the practical unavailability of review on appeal following final judgment. . . . We should not leave the enforcement by specific performance of otherwise valid contractual forum-selection clauses to the vicissitudes of virtually unfettered judicial discretion. Absent some compelling countervailing factor forum-selection clauses such as this one should be and should have been enforced by transfer or dismissal.
71
In January 2013, Atlantic petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, presenting the issues whether: (1) Stewart "change[d] the standard for enforcement of clauses that designate an alternative federal forum, limiting review of such clauses to a discretionary, balancing-of-conveniences 69 In re Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 701 F.3d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 2012) . 70 Id. at 743. 71 Id. at 743, 749 (Haynes, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Justice Samuel Alito, writing for a unanimous Court, agreed with Justice Kagan and rejected Atlantic's argument that the proper procedure for the enforcement of the forum-selection clause was a motion to dismiss under § 1406(a) and Rule 12(b)(3). In so holding, the Court made explicit Stewart's "implicit" holding, ruling:
Section 1406(a) and Rule 12(b)(3) allow dismissal only when venue is "wrong" or "improper." Whether venue is "wrong" or "improper" depends exclusively on whether the court in which the case was brought satisfies the requirements of federal venue laws [under § 1391] , and those provisions say nothing about a forum-selection clause. . . . When venue is challenged, the court must determine whether the case falls within one of the three categories set out in § 1391(b). If it does, venue is proper; if it does not, venue is improper, and the case must be 
75
The Court held that where a party breaches a valid 76 forum-selection clause that points to a specific federal forum by suing in an otherwise proper federal "venue" (under § 1391) other than that agreed upon, the aggrieved party may seek to enforce the forum-selection clause only by a motion to transfer filed under § 1404(a).
77
The Court, moreover, rejected the Fifth Circuit's finding that a forumselection clause specifying a nonfederal forum-i.e., a state or foreign forumshould be enforced under Rule 12(b)(3), which permits a party to file a pre-answer motion to dismiss for "improper venue." The Court reasoned that "[i]f venue is proper under [ § 1391], it does not matter for the purposes of Rule 12(b)(3) whether the forum-selection clause points to a federal or a nonfederal forum." 78 The Court, therefore, held that a litigant seeking to enforce a forum-selection provision that specifies a state or foreign forum may seek transfer only under forum non conveniens, a common law doctrine permitting transfer to a more convenient forum. 79 In terms of practical application, the Court noted that because "both § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens entail the same balancing-of-interests standard," district judges must evaluate forum-selection clauses requiring nonfederal forums "in the same way" they evaluate forum-selection clauses requiring federal forums: by examining public and private interest factors. 80 The Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's application of M/S Bremen's "reasonableness" test to enforce state or foreign forum-selection clauses. 75 Atl. Marine Constr., 134 S. Ct. at 577 (emphasis added). 76 See id. at 581 n.5 (noting that the Court's analysis presupposed a contractually valid forum-selection clause). 77 Id. 78 Id. at 580. Finally, the Court addressed the weight to be accorded a forum-selection clause within the § 1404(a) or forum non conveniens transfer analysis. The Court held that where a defendant files a motion to transfer based upon a valid forumselection clause, the district court "should ordinarily transfer the case to the forum specified" and should deny transfer " [o] nly [where] extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the parties clearly disfavor a transfer." 81 In terms of practical application, the Court clarified that:
In the typical case not involving a forum-selection clause, a district court considering a § 1404(a) motion (or a forum non conveniens motion) must evaluate both the convenience of the parties [i.e., the private interest factors] and various public-interest considerations . . . [to] decide whether, on balance, a transfer would serve "the convenience of parties and witnesses" and otherwise promote "the interest of justice."
82
According to the Court, however, the calculus changes where a "valid" forumselection clause is present, "which 'represents the parties' agreement'" with respect to the "most proper forum." In so holding, the Court sought to balance the principles of federalism with contractual freedom:
The enforcement of valid forum-selection clauses, bargained for by the parties, protects their legitimate expectations and furthers vital interests of the justice system. For that reason, and because the overarching consideration under § 1404(a) [and forum non conveniens] is whether a transfer would promote "the interest of justice," a valid forum-selection clause should be given controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases. . . . 83 81 Id. at 575, 581; see also id. at 579 (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (noting that "a proper application of § 1404(a) requires that a [valid] forumselection clause be 'given controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases'") (emphasis added). 82 Id. at 581 (emphasis added). The Court, therefore, held that the presence of a valid forum-selection clause "requires" the district courts to adjust the "usual" § 1404(a) or forum non conveniens transfer analysis in three ways. 84 First, if a valid forum-selection clause is present, the plaintiff's choice of forum "merits no weight" as it normally would for a motion to transfer under the "plaintiff's venue privilege," as expounded upon in Van Dusen. Rather, "as the party defying the forum-selection clause," the plaintiff "bears the burden of establishing that transfer to the forum for which the parties bargained is unwarranted." 85 Second, the presence of a valid forum selection clause now prohibits the district court from "consider [ing] arguments about the parties' private interests" when evaluating a defendant's § 1404(a) or forum non conveniens motion to transfer, on grounds that: " [w] hen parties agree to a forum-selection clause, they waive the right to challenge the preselected forum as inconvenient or less convenient for themselves or their witnesses, or for their pursuit of the litigation." 86 District courts must now "deem the private-interest factors to weigh entirely in favor" of the forum specified by the contract because "[w]hatever inconvenience [the parties] would suffer by being forced to litigate in the contractual forum" agreed upon was "clearly foreseeable at the time of contracting."
87 District judges, therefore, "may consider arguments about public-interest factors only," and because those factors "rarely defeat a transfer motion," the "practical result" is that unusual cases, therefore, "the interest of justice" is served by holding parties to their bargain.
Id. at 583. 84 Id. at 581. 85 Id. at 581-82 (emphasis added). With respect to this first change, the Court reasoned:
[W]hen a plaintiff agrees by contract to bring suit only in a specified forumpresumably in exchange for other binding promises by the defendant-the plaintiff has effectively exercised its "venue privilege" before a dispute arises. Only that initial choice deserves deference, and the plaintiff must bear the burden of showing why the court should not transfer the case to the forum to which the parties agreed.
Id. at 582. "forum-selection clauses should control except in unusual cases." 88 The Court emphasized that although it is "conceivable in a particular case" that the district court could "refuse to transfer a case notwithstanding the counterweight" of a forum-selection provision, "such cases will not be common." 89 Third, and finally, where a party to a valid forum-selection clause violates its contractual obligation by filing suit in a different, yet "proper," federal "venue," a § 1404(a) transfer "will not carry with it the original venue's choice-of-law rules" as would otherwise have been required by Van Dusen. 90 The district court in the contractually-selected venue, therefore, "[must] not apply the law of the transferor venue" upon a § 1404(a) transfer. 91 The Court did not address choice-of-law within the context of a forum non conveniens transfer, where Van Dusen does not apply.
With these new principles established, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision and remanded the case to the Texas district court to consider transfer to Virginia under § 1404(a), noting that "no public-interest factors that might support the denial of [Atlantic's] motion to transfer" seemed apparent from the record before it.
92
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ATLANTIC MARINE CONSTRUCTION
As discussed throughout this Note, the enforcement of forum-selection agreements involves, at its heart, an enduring dilemma between the right of private parties to contract and the principles of federalism, judicial economy, and jurisdictional uniformity. The United States Supreme Court has emphasized repeatedly that the enforcement of valid forum-selection clauses protects the parties' legitimate expectations and furthers the nation's justice and economic systems. At the same time, however, allowing a private agreement to render improper what Congress expressly deemed proper would undermine the constitutional provision for a federal court system, which carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and procedure of the federal courts. As stated, there is no easy way to plot a path through the murk. 88 Id. (emphasis added). 89 Id. 90 Id. at 582-83. 91 Id. Questions remain, however. Did the Court do enough in Atlantic Marine Construction to protect both the right to contract and the principles of federalism, judicial economy, and uniformity? What practical effect will Atlantic Marine Construction have for judges and practitioners with respect to the enforceability of forum-selection provisions?
Without doubt, the Court in Atlantic Marine Construction sought first to protect the principles of federalism. The Court held unanimously that private agreements cannot circumvent congressional venue law (i.e., § 1391)-and rightly so. The Constitution's creation of the federal court system, at its most fundamental level, demands such a result. If a private agreement had power to alter express congressional pronouncements with respect to "venue," litigants would likely argue that private agreements have power to alter other federal (or state) statutory mandates-perhaps both procedural and otherwise.
93 Such a finding would have been untenable for this reason.
But did the Court do enough to protect contractual freedom with respect to choice-of-forum? The answer to this question will depend upon how the lower courts construe the word "valid" as applied in Atlantic Marine Construction. Indeed, it is imperative to remember that the Court decided Stewart and Atlantic Marine Construction with the presumption that the underlying forum-selection clause was "valid" and enforceable against the parties.
94 The issue in Atlantic Marine Construction was, therefore, merely the procedure by which a litigant who seeks to enforce such a "valid" clause must proceed. This is reflected in the first sentence of the Court's opinion, which states: "[t]he question in [Atlantic Marine Construction] concerns the procedure that is available for a defendant in a civil case who seeks to enforce a forum-selection clause." 95 This language must guide judges and litigants in interpreting and arguing Atlantic Marine Construction-a case that does not speak, in any capacity, to the substance by which federal courts must measure the "validity" of a challenged forum-selection agreement. 93 Speculation with respect to specific examples of such cases is beyond the scope of this Note. 94 In Atlantic Marine Construction, "there was no dispute that the forum-selection clause was valid," and the Court was meticulous in specifying that its holding was that a district court should transfer a case " [w] hen the parties have agreed to a valid forum-selection clause." See Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 134 S. Ct. at 576-84 (emphasis added) (qualifying "forum-selection clause" with the word "valid" twelve times). 95 Id. at 575 (emphasis added). federal "venue" under § 1391. Where these elements are present, Atlantic Marine Construction is operative, and either § 1404(a) or forum non conveniens provides the proper procedural mechanism by which a defendant must seek to enforce the agreement. Without both of these elements, however, Atlantic Marine Construction does not apply and should not be cited as a substantive standard by which the forum-selection provision is deemed "valid."
VII. THE CORRECT APPROACH TO "VALIDITY": STATE LAW AND BIFURCATION
To recap, Atlantic Marine Construction successfully addressed Stewart's overly broad grant of judicial discretion under § 1404(a) but failed to define contractual "validity." The Court's repeated references to "validity" will likely divide the lower courts. The fairest approach to determining whether a forumselection clause is "valid" (which must be done before determining the appropriate procedural mechanism under Atlantic Marine Construction) is a bifurcated approach espoused (but not applied) by United States District Judge William Marsh Acker Jr. of the Northern District of Alabama:
If a court must determine that a forum-selection clause is "valid" before the clause is enforced with a § 1404 transfer order, [which it must do under the implicit holding of Atlantic Marine Construction,] it follows that the court must look to state contract law to determine the validity of the clause before it applies § 1404. In such a case, the state issue is first and separate from the federal issue [of transfer under Atlantic Marine Construction], and federal law could not be said to preempt applicable state law. Under such circumstances there should be no question that courts must apply state law pursuant to the "twin aims of Erie" test, under which a court cannot apply a federal rule if doing so would encourage forum shopping or produce inequitable administration of the law.
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If, after applying state law, the district court deems the contract "valid," it should apply Atlantic Marine Construction to test the propriety of transfer (as opposed to the "validity" of the contract itself) under either § 1404(a) or forum non conveniens, under which a valid forum-selection agreement should, of course, 103 Bright, 2014 WL 588051, at *2 (citing Stewart, 487 U.S. at 33-41) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (analyzing a forum-selection clause under Erie and concluding that " [t] he Eleventh Circuit's rule clearly encourages forum shopping . . . [because] suit might well not be pursued, or might not be as successful, in a significantly less convenient forum," and that the rule "allow [s] an unfair discrimination between noncitizens and citizens of the forum state")). control in all but the most exceptional cases. There, the "protection of legitimate interests" and "foreseeability" rationales underlying the very notion of forumselection provisions operate: The bargained-for contract is "valid" and enforceable against the parties under the only substantive law that governs (most) private contracts-state law.
If, however, after applying state law, the district court deems the forumselection agreement invalid and unenforceable under state law, it, of course, merits no weight within Atlantic Marine Construction's procedural transfer analysis. In such a case, the rationales underlying forum-selection provisions do not operate: The contract is legally deficient under substantive state law, "invalid," and unenforceable against the parties.
VIII. CONCLUSION: OVERTURN STEWART
Application of the bifurcated approach set forth above would require the Court to overturn Stewart-which held broadly, and without practical clarification, that federal law alone governs a district court's decision "to give effect" to forumselection provisions. While Atlantic Marine Construction (ostensibly) provides better protection for "valid" forum-selection clauses under certain circumstances, the Court must clarify what constitutes a "valid" clause to truly protect the legitimate expectations of contracting parties. Such a clarification would require the Court to overturn Stewart-a case that continues to muddle the enforceability of forum-selection provisions in federal courts more than two decades after its resolution.
If this bifurcated approach is conflated into one step-under which Atlantic Marine Construction is applied without first assessing the "validity" of the forumselection provision under state law-district judges will again have near plenary discretion to employ, in effect, any rationale they deem relevant in assessing the "weight" and "fairness" of the (purported) agreement within Atlantic Marine Construction's framework. Under such an approach, judges will be free to enforce or invalidate state law-controlled forum-selection provisions by way of purely procedural mechanisms (i.e., § 1404 or forum non conveniens), without first assessing the contract's substantive validity, provided they deem their own decision in the "interest of justice"-a quintessentially amorphous and subjective standard.
Litigants should, therefore, be weary of viewing Atlantic Marine Construction as a victory in support of forum-selection provisions (and contractual freedom in general) until the Court resolves the issues set forth in this Note. Litigants attempting to enforce forum-selection agreements in federal court should continue to seek to establish the validity of their contracts under state law (under Erie)-only after which should they argue that Atlantic Marine Construction mandates enforcement by way of § 1404 or forum non conveniens. Unfortunately, it will take
